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Informality as Illegality in Georgia’s Anti-Mafia Campaign    
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper examines the anti-mafia laws in Georgia and links the decline of informality under 
Saakashvili with the use of punitive measures in a concerted effort to establish legal centrism 
over and above other extra-legal normative orders. The paper discusses the specific informal 
practice of the obshchak, or mutual aid fund, and how this evolved to become linked to 
organized crime, making it an object of criminalization. Finally, the paper argues that 
punitiveness, framed in terms of fighting the mafia, was a key element in tackling informality. 
However, far from banishing informality, pressure in the criminal justice system led to systemic 
punitive informal practices within the state.  
 
Anti-mafia; organized crime; Georgia; law; punishment; informality 
 
 
Introduction 
 
What role does criminalization and punishment play in state projects to fight informality? 
Many informal practices are perfectly legal, and many are not. As Polese et al. (forthcoming), 
usefully define it ‘informality consists of a myriad of (economic, social and cultural) practices 
spread on a spectrum between the legal, the extra-legal and illegal.’ In contrast to informality, 
illegality is decided through acts of categorization by state institutions. Yet, the legal/illegal 
categorization can also go unapplied or be contested. As Polese (2013: 86) writes, ‘a law is a 
law, but the value and applicability of that law is ultimately decided by the people in social 
practice.’ That decision must take into account the nature of the particular law, and in the case of 
criminal law, the attendant punishments and credibility of their enforcement. This paper will 
show how criminalization, heightened punitiveness and credible enforcement were used in the 
case of Georgia to re-categorize many informal practices as illegal and credibly signal their 
unacceptability to society. In this paper, I focus on one particular aspect of this: the struggle with 
organized crime and in particular that subset of organized crime that provides protection, the 
mafia. This is known in Georgia as the k’anonieri kurdebi, often rendered in English as ‘thieves-
in-law’, where ‘law’ here means a code of honour. For the Georgian state, following the Rose 
Revolution of 2003, this network of made men represented an alternative normative order and 
‘juris-generator’ in competition with the state (Slade 2007, 2013). The thieves’ world (kurduli 
samq’aro) consisted of a set of informal institutions and practices that became widespread within 
Georgian society.  
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The paper’s main contribution is to use the example of the anti-mafia campaign to 
address the specific role that punitiveness – the use of severe and predictable punishment 
involving the deprivation of liberty - has played in Georgia in fighting against informality. The 
paper makes two key arguments: firstly, that criminalization was a cornerstone of the United 
National Movement’s (UNM) reform programme and that ‘organized crime’ became convenient 
shorthand for a slew of informal practices. Secondly, that, somewhat incongruously at the same 
time, informality was used in order to produce credibility in the enforcement of new and existing 
laws. The paper places greater emphasis on the second aspect highlighting informal practices of 
punishment which took hold in criminal justice institutions in order to make the fight against 
organized crime and corruption more effective. Informality became embedded in the punitive 
mechanisms employed by the state and was manifested in the collection of compromising 
material, the forcing of confessions and the employment of excessive violence by criminal 
justice actors.  
The paper draws on previous research (Slade 2012, 2013) into organized crime and the 
anti-mafia campaign in Georgia. This research involved on and off the record interviews with 
former convicts, criminal justice agents, NGOs and experts in two main sites: Tbilisi and Kutaisi 
between 2008 and 2011. I also collected police files, court cases and archival data. On top of 
this, the paper utilizes data from research conducted with the Open Society Georgia Foundation 
(Slade et al. 2014) on human rights abuse in Georgian prisons involving interview and survey 
data of prisoners and ex-prisoners. Finally, the paper also draws on data from an ongoing 
interview project of prisoners and ex-prisoners conducted by the author in a number of former 
Soviet countries, the results of which are only partially published (Piacentini and Slade 2015, 
Slade 2015).  
Before turning directly to the issue of informal practices of punishment, the paper will 
first give a discussion of the fight against the mafia as a project of legal centrism – permitting 
only one juris-generator, the state. The paper then discusses one particular informal practice – 
the obshchak or mutual fund – and its manifestations to understand how this informal practice 
came to be framed as organized crime and the state’s elision of the informal and the illegal. 
Finally, the paper examines punitiveness and the ways in which informal practices of 
punishment by the state have contributed to the attack on informality as organized crime. 
 
 
Creating Legal Centrism by Fighting Organized Crime 
There is now a burgeoning literature on the anti-corruption and institution building measures 
under the UNM government and Mikheil Saakashvili following the Rose Revolution of 2003 
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(World Bank 2012, Kupatadze 2012, Light 2014, Di Puppo 2010; Aliyev 2014, 2015). Reforms 
aimed at producing greater oversight in regulatory bodies, reducing the complexity of citizen-
state interactions, and ensuring effective enforcement of the law and prosecution of corrupt 
activity. World Bank (2012) indicators show that institutional performance improved in many 
areas under Saakashvili. In line with much of the literature on informality, efficient and 
streamlined institutions and procedures reduced reliance on informal practices and networks. 
However, Aliyev (2014, 2015) notes that due to a lack of progress on improving employment 
prospects, providing social security or poverty reduction, informal networks continue to be 
prominent as a form of non-state social support in Georgia. Change has occurred, as witnessed 
by survey data that shows a decline in those reporting utilizing informal connections to achieve 
formal positions. Aliyev (2014, 30) sums up: “institution-building processes in Saakashvili’s 
Georgia achieved a notable success in weakening such deeply-rooted informal practices as gift-
giving and reciprocal favours offered in return for preferential treatment in formal institutions.” 
What is missing from this conclusion is the reliance on criminalization, prosecutorial action and 
punitiveness in co-producing this notable success. 
 Recent works, based on grounded empirical research, describe how strategies of 
repression were utilized in Georgia. Rekhviashvili (2015) and Polese et al. (forthcoming) show 
how street vendors were targets of a state crackdown that pushed them out of public spaces in 
Tbilisi. Curro (2015) discusses the ways in which the informal institution of the birzha, a 
collective form of socializing in public, was similarly problematized. Dunn and Frederiksen 
(2015) ask what forms of sociality, ‘objects and habits’ have been lost – what ‘absences’ have 
been created - in the lightening quick flash of westernizing reforms. These works tend towards 
viewing political economic decision-making as the underlying cause of this process of making 
absent. Neo-liberalism, the domination of social relations by market logic, secured the fate of the 
birzha or low-level street vendor, even as societal actors fought back and resisted.  
Moreover, these authors show that such moves were framed by a discourse that 
highlighted the need to uproot backward tradition and practices in the name of modernization. 
Curro (2015) in particular focuses on the role of criminalization and punitiveness towards 
informal practices. This paper also looks at the role of punitive approaches to informality in 
Georgia. However, the paper aims to place the role of criminal sanctions more centrally in 
showing how punitiveness – predictable and severe punishment - was a vital mechanism 
standing behind state actions, whether purging corruption within the state or unofficial vendors 
from the street. Moreover, this paper aims to show that, while the UNM did indeed frame much 
of this fight with informality as a struggle with backwardness, criminal justice itself became 
suffused with informal punitive practices.  
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 The UNM produced a discourse that emphasized the modernization of Georgia through 
re-establishment of state control over territory, administration and resources after over a decade 
of state decline. The rule of law was one perceived goal of this modernization. To this end, a 
particular view of the law, and particularly criminal law, took hold. Law after the Rose 
Revolution was a social instrument for changing behavior and attitudes. States around the world 
utilize law in this manner, yet law must also operate with some notion of embeddedness with 
prevailing social norms and rules (Galligan and Kurkchiyan 2003). The peculiar problem for 
reformers across the post-Soviet region was that the prevailing social norms in these countries 
appeared to be anti-law. That is to say, there existed a “negative myth of law” (Kurkchiyan 
2003), ‘legal alienation’ and ‘legal nihilism’ (Hendley 1999, 2000, 2012; Gibson 2003). Law 
could therefore hardly dovetail with collective consciousness. The issue, as Galligan (2003, 15) 
puts it, is that the supremacy of law over informal norms requires “that those whose social norms 
have to be changed are open to change through law; that in turn depends on a threshold 
acceptance of law as…a proper and legitimate way of ordering society.”  
A lack of this threshold acceptance was thought to be most acute in the South Caucasus 
republics during Soviet times (Law 1974). Various measures of the scale of second economic 
activity, law-breaking and the use of nepotism suggest that this was particularly true of Georgia 
(Feldbrugge 1989, Grossman 1998, Alexeev and Pyle 2003). Moreover, reliance on informal 
networks and social norms only intensified during the virtual collapse of the state in the 1990s 
(Zurcher 2005, Kupatadze 2012). Thus, by 2003 in Georgia, legal nihilism and alienated 
statehood were seen as major obstacles to modernization and development (Kukhianidze 2003, 
Nordin and Glonti 2006). As discussed below, the UNM, with an impressive popular mandate 
after the Rose Revolution, openly attempted to utilize the law as an instrument to overcome the 
embeddedness of informal norms and practices. However, law-making was a largely executive 
and elite driven process (Berglund 2013, Tangiashvili and Slade 2014). Galligan’s (2003, 11) 
characterization of the law as a social instrument serves as a good description of its use by the 
Georgian state after the Rose Revolution: “the image here is not of law as an expression of social 
norms and in turn shared values…but rather of law as detached from them; it is an image of a 
relatively separate and autonomous system of authority.” In Georgia, the overarching goal was 
legal centrism – for the state to become the one autonomous system of authority and source of 
law in the country.  
This goal, at the heart of the UNM reform agenda, faced big obstacles. In Georgia, as in 
other post-communist countries, in conditions of alienated statehood informal norms and 
practices can take on highly complex organizational forms (Tilly 2006, Morris and Polese 2014). 
They can become entrenched, often codified and institutionalized informally among various 
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social groupings, and supported by a logic of appropriateness as much as instrumentality (March 
and Olsen 2008). When this occurs and such groupings become criminalized they can come to be 
called mafias or criminal organizations. These overlap with the state and may compete with it. 
Charles Tilly (1985) classically argued that states historically begin as force-wielding 
organizations imposing protection rackets over a given territory. In this sense, only a degree of 
legitimacy distinguishes states from mafia groups as well as acceptance, often bestowed over 
time by virtue of the protection rents that accrue to those that are taxed. Symbols, imagery, and 
historical narratives further burnish legitimacy. In areas of limited statehood today, organized 
criminal groups can produce protection rents and develop forms of external and internal 
legitimacy within communities, taking on some of the trappings of a state (see Fiorentini 1995, 
Shortland and Varese 2012, Slade 2013). Thus, organized criminality can become highly 
developed, utilizing ritualized codes of honour and sets of informal institutions to produce 
monitoring and sanctioning, regulate relationships and coordinate interaction. In such 
circumstances organized criminal groups can operate as an alternative juris-generator to the state. 
Georgia had just such a problem – a plurality of social actors claiming to uphold and 
promote a set of informal rules that were congruent with Georgian values. Particularly prominent 
in this were the thieves-in-law. The thieves-in-law are made men emerging from prisoner 
hierarchies. They wear protected insignia (specific tattoos) and adjudicate on disputes, collecting 
tribute from those under their protection. They also represent a wider normative world, a 
subculture, in which a set of particular informal social norms, language and practices hold sway 
(Gurov 1995, Dolgova 2003, Slade 2013). The Georgian government from the end of 2005 chose 
a strategy of direct criminalization of these actors to fight them. However, in utilizing an anti-
organized crime strategy the government engaged in net-widening; cracking down on much 
broader forms of informality such as the birzha (Curro 2015) and the use of public space for 
vending (Rekhviashvili 2015) discussed in other works.  
 One way this occurred was through anti-mafia laws. Such laws, such as the US’ 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations act (RICO) of the 1970s or the anti-mafia 
commissions of the 1980s and 1990s in Italy, aim at providing legal powers to disrupt and 
prosecute networks of organized criminals including those actors who give orders. Further than 
this though, such laws also criminalize association with and facilitation of mafia groups and their 
activities. In the Soviet Union, it was not until the 1980s when the existence of organized 
criminality finally became recognized. Legislation from that time can still be found in the 
criminal codes of many post-Soviet countries. Soviet legislation made a curious distinction 
between criminal groups (gruppirovki) and criminal communities (soobshchestva) with the latter 
term applying to larger, more serious and long-standing groups (Dolgova 2003). The use of this 
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distinction suggests an acknowledgement by law-makers of serious organized crime and mafias 
in the Soviet Union; criminal corporate entities that existed over and above the individuals that 
made them up. The thieves-in-law network was perhaps the most obvious example of such 
entities.  
The Georgian Law on Organized Crime introduced in late December 2005 built on the 
existing Soviet legislation and went beyond it. Firstly, it introduced the crime of mafia 
association. Secondly, it criminalized certain informal statuses, most specifically that of “thief-
in-law”, introducing prison slang into the criminal code. Article 223 of the criminal code states: 
“1. membership of the thieves’ world [kurduli samq’aro] is punishable by deprivation of liberty 
for a term of 5 to 8 years…2. Being a thief-in-law [k’anonieri kurdi] is punishable by deprivation 
of liberty for a term of 7 to 10 years.” Legally, the thieves’ world is defined as a group of people 
who act on special orders recognized by them. The aim of these orders is to gain profit through 
intimidation, threats, force, or criminal dispute resolution [garcheva]. These activities seek the 
involvement of juveniles and encourage criminal acts by others. A member of this world is 
someone who recognises the criminal authorities and seeks to achieve the goals of the thieves’ 
world. ‘Criminal dispute resolution’ is the settlement of a difference between two or more parties 
by a member of the thieves’ world that can employ threats, force or intimidation. A ‘thief-in-law’ 
is a member of the thieves’ world who organises activities in accordance with the rules 
recognised by the members (Prosecution Service 2006, 12). Furthermore, Article 37 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure provides the prosecutor the right to request the confiscation of property if 
there are grounds to believe that the property was acquired from racketeering or through 
membership of the thieves’ world (Prosecution Service 2006, 13). 
 This legislation was unique and highly specific. It carried a number of problems 
concerning the burden of proof, admissibility of certain forms of evidence, and a potential threat 
to the right to free association from over-zealous police, investigators and prosecutors. Proving 
that someone possessed a criminal status or membership of a criminal community was not easy 
in Georgia as no feasible witness protection programme had been instituted. Thus, proving that 
someone was a thief-in-law or a member of the thieves’ world often relied upon legally dubious 
self-incrimination, police testimony and wire-tapping that may not always have had judicial 
authorization. Supporters of the new laws argue that the legislation is only used against 
individuals who engage in provable criminal acts within the terms of the thieves’ world 
(Lomsadze 2014). Hence proving that a defendant recognized the authority of the thieves-in-law 
often involved producing evidence of engaging in informal practices associated with the thieves’ 
subculture as well as evidence of criminal status and utilizing the jargon terms of the criminal 
world. 
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 Thus, when the professional footballer Giorgi Demetradze was found guilty along with 
two others of extorting winnings from football gamblers in 2010, he found himself charged 
under Article 223/1, membership of the thieves’ world. Thousands of dollars’ worth of assets 
were confiscated from Demetradze and others. The use of the anti-mafia legislation in this case 
was based on evidence that the extorted money was parceled out to the so-called obshchak, a 
mutual aid fund originally collected in prison, and also a criminal term for the pooling of dirty 
money. Demetradze set out to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Izet 
Ashlarba had got there before him. In 2007, Ashlarba had similarly been convicted as a member 
of the thieves’ world on three grounds: his involvement in ‘criminal dispute resolution’ over a 
disagreement concerning an apartment, his use of coercion to ensure a taxi driver was paid a debt 
owed to him, and a discussion concerning the use of an obshchak with a prisoner. Ashlarba 
challenged his seven-year sentence at the ECtHR asserting that the concepts within the new laws 
were not understandable and too generally defined for him to have foreseen that he was violating 
the law in his actions. The ECtHR rejected his application, arguing that the concepts, and their 
related practices, contained within the laws were ‘common, public knowledge’ (ECtHR 2015). 
 The court was no doubt correct; these were indeed common, publically understood 
practices. They were widespread and practiced by Georgians who had spent decades going about 
their lives within informal frameworks to do such things as Ashlarba had: resolve disputes, 
ensure payments or redistribute resources. Now to reassert the state, informal ways of doing such 
things had to withdraw and formal frameworks had to prevail. Disputes over apartment 
ownership should be resolved through the courts or properly instituted and internationally 
promoted Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms. Ripped off taxi drivers should turn to the 
police. Hard up prisoners should be provided for through the state or by credit from relatives 
accessible on bank cards provisioned by recognized banks.  
To achieve this change in behaviour, the government had chosen criminalization as its 
preferred strategy. Many forms of informality were framed as organized crime and became 
illegal (Curro 2015, Rekhviashvili 2015). The policy choice to criminalize certain practices 
within the framework of anti-organized crime demonstrated the concern that certain forms of 
informality had evolved into complex practices that facilitated the activities of serious criminals. 
These forms of informality could compete with the state in producing rules as well as provide the 
mechanisms for enforcing those rules. However, as Ashlarba’s and others’ legal appeals 
suggested, it was difficult to distinguish between what was simply informal and what was 
criminal. Moreover, some of the now criminal informal practices had degrees of popular 
legitimacy; some Georgians were just not open to having their social norms and practices shifted 
by law in this way. Sozar Subari, the Ombudsman at the time of the anti-mafia legislation, 
8  
suggested just this: that to begin with, some people had simply not supported nor understood the 
new laws and the seriousness and credibility of their enforcement (Interview with author, June 
2008). The obshchak, introduced above, demonstrated this blurring between informality and 
organized criminality. The paper now discusses this practice and its manifestations in order to 
better understand the logic of the state’s attack on them. 
 
The Obshchak: Double Taxation and the Moral Economy of the Criminal 
Practices of resource pooling, sharing and redistribution outside of state frameworks are common 
to all forms of society (Mauss 1954, Scott 1976). Outside of straightforward kin networks, the 
sequestering of resources by wider networks that manage those resources through complex codes 
of trust and informal rule enforcement can exist in the form of religious sects, utopian 
communities, smuggling networks, migrant communities, or street and prison gangs, to give just 
a few examples (Kanter 1972, Tilly 2006). As some of these examples show, such resource 
pooling can cross the boundaries of legality. In the Soviet context, the obshchak or prisoner 
mutual fund, was a form of resource pooling and redistribution that, by 2006 in Georgia, had 
become in the eyes of the state synonymous with organized crime.  
The obshchak is a Russian term that emerged in the early Soviet penal system (Gurov 
1995, Varese 2001, Dolgova 2003). It derives from the Russian adjective for shared, common or 
communal (obshchii). It refers to a collective fund, used primarily for the purposes of mutual aid 
among like-minded convicts. In its original incarnation it might be understood as a form of moral 
economy, ensuring that everyone in the penal labour camps had enough to survive, ensuring the 
‘right to subsistence’ regardless of the deprivations wrought by the state (Scott 1976, Thompson 
1966). It is still collected throughout post-Soviet prisons. In many cases, such as in Lithuania, the 
term is used for such mundane activities as the pooling of cigarettes and tea. Social norms 
dictated that in the communal context of the prison dormitory, a prisoner that one week received 
a package of tea or food should give some of its contents over for communal use. This would be 
both an investment in the prisoner’s social standing, a signal of value-orientation, and provide a 
basis for reciprocal generosity if the next month the prisoner received no packages. Thus, the 
level to which voluntarism existed regarding the obshchak is very difficult to judge, 
howevermany prisoners suggest giving was incentivized through informal norms and reciprocity 
rather than coercion (Author interviews with Lithuanian prisoners, January 2015, and Georgian 
ex-prisoners, June 2013). 
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This pooling of resources by convicts and ex-convicts began to take on a moral quality 
and produced forms of solidarity in the Soviet Union, a country where millions had passed 
through the prison camp system. The obshchak became sacralised as surrender of the individual 
to the collective. In post-Soviet Georgia, criminal materials confiscated by police included a 
document with rules concerning the use of the obshchak (Glonti and Lobjanidze 2004, 118-119). 
This document states that: ‘the obshchak is a sacred place. It may only be governed by saintly 
people…these people must be absolutely honest to the thieves’ idea, dedicated in their heart and 
soul…Every keeper [of the obshchak] must have from five to fifteen people in his care.’ Misuse 
of the obshchak and abuse by the keepers was framed in terms of a sin. This sacralisation of the 
community that the obshchak represents is by no means unique. Communal work and 
investments that cause feelings of a higher calling to a collectivity are common in groups such as 
religious sects and utopian communities (Kanter 1972; Tilly 2005).  
As a mode of pooling resources, the obshchak became an informal taxation system that 
involved redistribution, in principle based on the maxim to each according to their need. 
McDonnell (2013) argues that the practice provided security and was consumption based, rather 
than predatory and based on selling protection. In any case, there appears to have been a move in 
Georgia from specific to generalized reciprocity. In other words, investment in the obshchak for 
many prisoners gave no immediate returns. Resources were managed by those at the top of the 
prisoner hierarchy who could abuse their position, embezzle and cheat. Some investments, 
particularly direct and large financial ones, were surely involuntary. However, investors also 
then had an interest in remaining within the criminal community to reap the long-term returns as 
they moved up the prison hierarchy. Thus, at least in Georgia the obshchak became a form of 
generalised reciprocity that locks those who practice it into future consistent lines of action. The 
obshchak at once produced normative commitment and solidarity primarily among a substantial 
outcast population as well as rational incentives to maintain ties within that population (Slade 
2013).  
The obshchak then was analytically distinct from organized crime. However, in terms of 
the latter, the obshchak became more and more useful as a practice of sequestering resources in a 
predatory manner. The obshchak originally aided cooperation for the population of the Soviet 
gulag and its norms and practices lent themselves to coordination in criminal markets beyond the 
state as well as for the purposes of extortion outside prison. The moral framework of giving for 
mutual aid framed much racketeering. For example, in the village of Taglioni in the 
demilitarized zone between Abkhazia and Georgia a thief-in-law called Merab Okujava 
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‘regularly collected tribute from the residents of his region in the form of a regular sum of 
money’ (Prime Crime 2007). In an argument over collecting for the obshchak in March 2007, 
Okujava shot one of his potential contributors in the leg. In 2006, 19 people were arrested in 
Tbilisi and an obshchak, containing 100,000 lari ($50,000 USD) was seized. Along with the 
money, an encoded list was recovered with names, dates and amounts given. According to the 
Georgian police, ‘the money was collected by criminal authorities or contributed by people who 
voluntarily donated money to support the criminal world and transferred funds to this criminal 
account’ (Prime Crime 2006). Examples of the obshchak containing huge amounts of money and 
funnelling up to thieves-in-law have been discovered by police forces investigating post-Soviet 
organized crime far beyond Georgia, in Austria, Greece and Sweden. 
However, the term obshchak covers a wide array of meanings. Public or common 
understanding of this phenomenon ranges from packs of tea in a communal box in a prison 
dormitory up to large-scale money laundering by Georgian migrants through the construction 
industry on the Costa del Sol in Spain. For prisoners, the obshchak represented prisoner 
solidarity and a practice that could ease the pains of imprisonment. For some prisoners it could 
of course easily exacerbate these pains too. However, the riots and disturbances in prisons across 
Georgia at the start of the anti-mafia campaign in 2006 were to some degree a sign of resistance 
to disruption of an embedded moral economy of the criminal. Thus, the obshchak represents the 
difficulties in untangling dangerous criminality from broader informal practices of self-help and 
mutual aid that may constitute such a moral economy in areas of limited statehood, whether 
indigent rural villages or decrepit prison cells. In Georgia, the niceties of such distinctions would 
no longer be considered once the anti-mafia campaign began. Collecting the obshchak or even 
referring to it in prison became punishable as a form of insubordination, while as we have seen 
discussions about and collection of the obshchak outside prison was prosecutable evidence of 
membership of the thieves’ world.  
What does the example of the obshchak demonstrate regarding how and why 
criminalization is pursued as a state strategy against informality? The obshchak shows a 
particular form of informality that directly subtracted resources from those that would be 
otherwise requisitioned by the state. When the state is weak, state actors may calculate that 
criminalizing such practices is not worth the risk of possible societal resistance. Moreover, state 
actors might be co-opted by mafia groups through corruption, lowering the chances that the state 
will choose to fight organized criminality. Instead, weak states may reduce the burdens of legal 
forms of taxation and resource acquisition to maintain social stability, tacitly accepting the 
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presence of other sources of taxation. However, when double taxation by legal and extra-legal 
actors becomes too onerous on citizens it may create social instability (Celentani et al. 1995). 
Thus, at such times, if the state has the means it can be incentivized to at least try to eliminate the 
competition in the form of legal crackdowns or anti-mafia campaigns.  
In Georgia, one of the main mandates of the Saakashvili government was to build 
institutions, collect resources and use those resources for the public good. Criminalizing the 
obshchak in the framework of anti-mafia laws that enabled asset seizure was a method of 
achieving this. The obshchak was only one example of a significant process of turning the 
informal into the illegal. However, criminalization was only one aspect of this. New laws have to 
be credible and their enforcement credibly signalled. In Georgia, this occurred through extremely 
punitive measures. The paper now seeks to better establish the role of punitiveness in the attack 
on informality and the ways in which that punitiveness often rested itself on informal practices.    
 
Punishing Informality 
 
The anti-corruption campaign and reforms to government bureaucracy and law enforcement 
under the UNM are generally perceived positively, producing an overall reduction in the reliance 
on bribery, gift-giving and informal networking to get things done (Aliyev 2014). What has been 
less emphasized is the ways in which the practice of punishment also impacted on informality. 
Criminalization of particular practices does not necessarily imply punitiveness – criminal 
sanctions can still display leniency, allow for discretion or go unenforced. This was not the case 
under Saakashvili. Punitiveness is a complex concept, encompassing variation in the severity and 
predictability in punishment and degrees of deprivation suffered. However, in the present day the 
deprivation of liberty is a cornerstone of the concept as the use of prison has increased across 
parts of Western Europe and North America (see Frost 2006, Campbell 2015). Thus, 
incarceration rates are a convenient and comparable proxy measure for punitiveness. 
 On this measure, the Georgian state under Saakashvili was extremely punitive. The 
prison population increased 300% between 2003 and 2010, from 6,000 to 24,000 people. 
Georgia, by the time Saakashvili left office in 2013, was in the top ten incarcerators in the world 
per capita of the population. Under a zero tolerance approach adopted in early 2006, even petty 
crime was punishable by mandatory custodial sentences. Average sentence lengths increased 
from one to five years between 2004 and 2008 (Slade et al. 2014). Thus, Georgians were 
massively disincentivized from those forms of informality that had become criminalized due to 
the harshness and predictability of the sanctions that the law provisioned. This was demonstrated 
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above by the harsh sanctions that were produced against those found to be members of the 
thieves’ world. Indeed, it may be that the use of an anti-mafia discourse enabled the legitimation 
of such harshness for even petty crime. Thus, criminalization and punitiveness were key parts of 
the story in explaining the Georgian struggle with informality.  
 Moreover, as the state fought informality the pressures of that fight pushed criminal 
justice practitioners to use practices that deviated from formal legal frameworks. As the 
caseloads in the courts increased by tens of thousands within the space of a few years, pressures 
on prosecutors and judges increased. The main solution to this was the practice of plea-
bargaining (Transparency International 2010). This had been introduced into the system in 2004 
almost as soon as the UNM had come to power. Guilty pleas before trial reduced prison 
sentences for the defendant and sped up the process for the courts. By 2011, 87% of cases ended 
with a plea (Supreme Court of Georgia 2011). More problematic were the methods by which 
such pleas were obtained. Directly after the Rose Revolution, and before the zero tolerance era in 
2006, long waiting times in pre-trial detention incentivized defendants to simply make a plea, 
pay a fine and be released from pre-trial facilities (Areshidze 2007). The World Bank (2012) 
refers to this as ‘unconventional solutions,’ a euphemism for the successful avoidance of due 
process in tackling corruption and sequestering resources for the state. In the same World Bank 
report, Saakashvili admitted that deliberate and extra-judicial pressure was used to re-coup 
resources believed to be owed to the state from businesses and individuals. Due to this, the state 
budget came to be referred to by some as its own form of obshchak. While undoubtedly this was 
a somewhat unfair comparison, the informal methods by which the state used criminal justice to 
begin institution-building undermined its legitimacy. 
Once the zero tolerance policy was implemented in 2006, there is evidence that other 
forms of informal pressures were applied to pre-trial detainees and prisoners. The use of torture 
in the Georgian prison system was exposed in 2012 when video footage was released on 
YouTube of the beating and sexual abuse of prisoners. A survey of 1,199 prisoners and ex-
prisoners by Open Society Georgia Foundation (Slade et al 2014) found that almost half of 
respondents knew ‘many’ (defined as six or more) prisoners who as a result of torture or 
inhumane treatment had agreed to a plea bargain; 35% of respondents knew of ‘many’ prisoners 
who had given up assets to the state as a result of improper physical and psychological pressure; 
15% of all respondents claimed that they had given a plea bargain under duress (Slade et al 2014, 
48-49). The scale of the torture and inhumane treatment is difficult to assess; however, thousands 
of videos are purported to exist and the existence of many of these have been confirmed by 
NGOs and human rights defenders. Moreover, 75% of respondents in the survey claimed to have 
been victims of physical beating and 8% said their abuse had been filmed. There is some 
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evidence from testimony by torture survivors as well as the survey data that torture and physical 
abuse was directed against those who were perceived as supporting the thieves’ world. One 
interview respondent who had thievish tattoos on his knees had his leg broken by prison guards. 
One ex prisoner testifies that during beatings prisoners were forced to insult the thieves in law. 
Any attempt to collect an obshchak or even speak in criminal jargon could be brutally punished.  
In framing the fight against informality as one of anti-organized crime, the state itself 
used both formal and informal forms of punishment. The use of extra-legal methods and 
kompromat or compromising material in the form of abusive videos showed the state’s reliance 
on informal practices for the functioning of the criminal justice system. Collecting information, 
maintaining prison order, forcing confessions, incentivizing cooperation and plea bargains were 
achieved in many cases by the use of widespread yet hidden informal coercive state practices. 
The irony is that the state’s goal of modernizing through destroying backwards and anti-modern 
forms of social organization in the end was pursued using the harshest of informal methods 
itself, torture and extra-legal violence. The use of anti-organized crime rhetoric perhaps served to 
justify this approach as a means to an end. Far from banishing informality, the Georgian state 
actually depended on it in pursuing its professed goal of the rule of law. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper was concerned with a specific aspect of the fight against informality in Georgia as 
part of a modernizing and westernizing agenda under the UNM. The paper has argued that 
punitiveness – severe and predictable punishment – was a central aspect of fighting informality 
in Georgia. Criminalization was not enough; law enforcement had to be credibly signaled. The 
paper considered Georgia’s anti-mafia campaign as a lens to examine this punitiveness. The 
paper has argued that the anti-mafia campaign enabled the UNM to penalize a wide range of 
informal practices by framing these as organized crime. In so doing, certain forms of informality 
were securitized and presented as a threat to Georgia’s modernization. This legitimated a 
particularly punitive approach which itself utilized informal practices of punishment to function. 
This in turn blurred the boundaries between the formal and the informal once more, making the 
state budget, for some in Georgian society, no different from the criminal mutual fund, or 
obshchak. 
The obshchak, as double taxation, demonstrated how certain forms of informality 
produced direct competition with the state for resources. Moreover, the informal institutions and 
array of practices that supported the obshchak also point to a competing extra-legal, socially 
embedded, normative order. For all these reasons, there were plenty of incentives to frame such 
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informality in terms of organized crime in Georgia and pursue this with punitive zeal. Organized 
crime became a useful shorthand for backwards, anti-modern and traditional mentalities and their 
attendant informal practices. It also legitimated harsh sanctions and zero tolerance towards 
informality now re-conceptualized as crime. Yet, in utilizing criminalization and extreme 
punitiveness to fight informality, the state itself turned ironically towards informal practices to 
manage the criminal justice system.  
Thus, the mutualism of the formal and the informal was not destroyed in Georgia; it 
became embedded in the management of investigations, court cases and prisons. The 
strengthened and streamlined formal institutions and frameworks credited with reducing 
informality in Georgia were often in practice effective only through a reliance on practices that 
were both informal and illegal. The Georgian case study of fighting the informal then is 
instructive in the ways in which state strategies of anti-organized crime campaigns and 
punitiveness can be used to modernize society and uproot the informal, at the same time as 
creating new and pernicious forms of it. 
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